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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is now well-recognised that institutions matter in the growth process both 
directly and indirectly. Well-functioning institutions lead to higher investment levels, 
better policies, increase in social capital stock of a community, and better 
management of ethnic diversity and conflicts [see for example North (1990, 1994); 
Jutting (2003); Rodrik, et al. (2002); Dollar and Kray (2002); World Bank (2002); 
Aron (2000); Chu (2001) and Frischtak (1995)].  That the decay of institutions has 
led to poor governance—and the urgent need for improved governance in Pakistan 
particularly—has been well-documented in DRI/McGraw-Hill (1998); Pakistan 
(1999) and Hassan (2002). Transparent, participatory, and efficient working of 
institutions ensures correct priorities and appropriate policies; their effective and 
efficient implementation results in high growth, better income distribution, and 
alleviation of poverty.  
Institutional development has been very slow in Pakistan, and more often than 
not these have been abused by the èlite to extract rent [Hussain (1999)]. Over the last 
three decades, and especially in the 1990s, even the institutions that existed have 
degenerated.  Poor governance resulting from the mal-functioning of institutions has 
denied the poor any participation in the decision-making process, and they have 
failed to derive any benefit from the rising levels of per capita incomes.
1  The rising 
poverty in turn has led to further decay of institutions and the poor are caught in the 
vicious circle [see Hassan (2002)].   
Pakistan’s financial indicators have become quite strong and one hopes that 
this will result in higher levels of private and public investment. However, it needs to 
be ensured that the poor also benefit from the development process. To ensure that 
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public investment does not go waste and adds to productive capacity, and that private 
sector investment results in higher level of welfare, the country needs a credible and 
proper institutional framework which is transparent and predictable. The present 
paper examines the role of institutions in the growth and in poverty reduction in the 
context of institutional development in Pakistan. It also analyses the prospects of 
better governance in Pakistan.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. Following this Introduction, the definition 
and typology of institutions are analysed in Section II. The transaction costs 
associated with different types of institutional framework and the evolution of 
institutions are examined in Section III. The institutional framework and the impact 
on the poor in Pakistan are analysed in Section IV. The recent initiatives to improve 
governance and institutional framework are examined in Section V. The main 
conclusions are summarised in Section VI.  
 
II.  DEFINITION AND TYPOLOGY OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
The Definition of Institutions 
The World Bank (2002) defines institutions as rules, enforcement 
mechanisms, and organisations. According to North (1990), institutions are any form 
of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction including 
prohibitions on individuals, and the circumstances under which individuals are 
permitted to undertake certain activities. Institutions are the rules, including 
behavioural norms, by which agents interact; the organisations implement rules and 
codes of conduct to achieve desired outcomes.  
The policies and institutions interact; whereas policies impact the evolution of 
institutions, the institutions affect the policies that are adopted. We may note that the 
institutions work as systems; improvement in one part affects the efficiency of the 
whole system. Therefore, institutional development must have a holistic approach, 
wherein various small reforms complement each other to improve efficiency and 
build a momentum for larger reforms. Strength of the rule of law, risk of 
expropriation, and the security of property rights are mainly the outcome of the 
institutional set-up of the country.  
 
The Typology of Institutions 
Institutions may be classified in three ways, viz., by degree of formality; 
levels of hierarchy; and area of analysis [For details, see Jutting (2003)]. Institutions 
may be formal, i.e., existing in written rules, but in general they are based on the 
unwritten codes of conduct. Formal rules comprise constitutions, laws, property 
rights, charters, bye-laws, statute and common law, and regulations; and enforcement 
characteristics. Alternatively, the institutions may be informal, basically extensions, 
elaborations, and modifications of formal rules; socially sanctioned norms of Institutional Change, Growth, and Poverty 
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behaviour (customs, taboos, and traditions); and internally enforced standards of 
conduct. Whereas both types of institutions are present in the developed and 
developing economies, the reliance on informal institutions to facilitate transactions 
is high in developing economies. This is because formal institutions are less 
developed and they rarely come to the rescue of the poor. World Bank (2002) 
suggests that the informal institutions go a long way towards resolving information 
and enforcement problems without resorting to the formal public legal systems. 
While this is true, we must also note that even the informal institutions are misused 
by the èlite for its own benefits. The formal or informal institutions would result in a 
higher level of welfare only if they are judiciously employed.
2  
Informal institutions can be superior to formal alternatives, either because 
they are more efficient at achieving the objective or because they embody features 
that formal institutions are unable to provide. However, informal institutions may 
prevent further market development if closed networks restrict the scale and extent 
of possible transactions. They may also exclude potential entrants and partners. 
Formal institutions are important because they can deal with a larger group of 
participants and because, if well-designed, they can serve to include more people 
rather than exclude them. 
Williamson (2000) proposes classification of the institutions based on 
different hierarchical levels. The Level 1 institutions are social norms, customs, 
traditions, etc. and most of the transactions undertaken are regulated by expectations 
based on beliefs and identities. Because non-compliance may result in economic and 
social sanctions, they are well respected and are easy to enforce. Level 2 are the 
formal institutions such as conventions or laws but sometimes they also include 
informal institutions such as rules governing access to natural resources. These 
institutions define and enforce property rights. Level 3 institutions relate to order and 
incentives and build the governance structure of a society resulting in the 
organisations such as local or national government, state agencies, NGOs, etc.  The 
Level 4 institutions define the extent to which adjustment occurs through prices or 
quantities, and influence the resource allocation mechanism.   
The institutions may be economic, political, legal, or social [see Bowles 
(1998) and Beck, et al. (2002)]. The economic institutions include markets and 
determine production, allocation and distribution process of goods and services. 
Political institutions relate to holding of elections, electoral rules, type of political 
system, opposition and the government, measures of checks and balances and 
political stability. The legal institutions refer to the type of legal system, the 
definition and enforcement of property rights and legal origin.  The social institutions 
relate to rules that govern access to social sectors such as health and education and 
social security arrangements, and gender balance.  
 
2In developing markets, informal institutions tend to substitute for the lack of formal systems, 
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The efficient institutions promote growth, and efficiency of the institutions 
may be defined in terms of allocative efficiency and in terms of reduction in the cost 
of using the system of rules. Posner (1998) argues that “affluence in developed 
countries is a cumulative result of efficient institutions; poverty in poor countries of 
inefficient institutions.” Obviously, for promotion of economic activities, rules 
relating to laws, regulatory measures, policies, and decrees should be stable so that 
economic agents are able to predict how the rules would affect returns on their 
investment. Rules should be interpreted and implemented objectively and without 
discretion.  
 
III.  THE TRANSACTION COSTS AND EVOLUTION  
OF INSTITUTIONS 
Economic transactions comprise exchanges between buyers and sellers, 
between creditors and debtors, and more broadly among competitors. Political 
transactions comprise exchanges between rulers and constituents, between 
representatives and voters, and among competing political groups, etc. [see North 
(1990) and Chu (2001)]. Transaction costs rise due to inadequate information, 
incomplete definition and enforcement of property rights, and barriers to entry for 
new participants. The institutions help manage risks from market exchange, increase 
efficiency, and raise returns to investment.  
With a view to improving the efficiency of the institutions, distinction 
between rule-making and rule-implementing needs to be clearly understood. If the 
formulators and implementers of the rules are the same, those benefiting from the 
existing institutions may encourage organisations and interest groups having stake in 
the existing set up to forestall the possibilities of changes in the institutions.  
There is a need for nondiscretionary rule implementation, and, therefore, 
organisations need to be made independent of political and other interventions. This 
may be done through establishment of autonomous and independent organisations. 
These organisations must be held accountable to the public on the basis of strict and 
transparent performance requirements. There should be a well defined, accountable 
selection and removal procedures criteria for their officers. 
The institutions for economic transactions evolve in two phases. In the first 
phase, intracommunity transactions rely on personal ties and intercommunity 
transactions take place with inadequate intercommunity institutions. In the second 
phase, there are efficient institutions for impersonal intracommunity and 
intercommunity economic transactions throughout a nation state. Legal and other 
rules with third-party enforcement also govern intergroup and intragroup political 
transactions. A low-cost transaction system provides opportunities for specialisation 
and efficient production, and institutions in developed economies have these 
features.  Institutional Change, Growth, and Poverty 
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Institutional development is a learning process, and they evolve as a result of 
interactions among rules, organisational or individual agents, and institutional 
entrepreneurs. The institutions are country-specific and depend on the values in the 
system. For example, Rodrik, et al. (2002) points out that “desirable institutional 
arrangements have a large element of context specificity, arising from differences in 
historical trajectories, geography and political economy or other initial condition. 
Similarly, International Monetary Fund (2003) found that what specific institutional 
setting will work best in a specific local context is difficult to ascertain because 
countries with a similar level of income have different institutional settings with 
varying degrees of success. North (1994) points out that culture plays an important 
role in characterising informal norms and in reinforcing, or interfering with, the 
functioning of formal rules. 
North (1990) points out that institutional change depends on changes in the 
relative costs associated with such changes and preferences of the society. However, 
once a particular course is chosen, the network externalities, the learning process of 
organisations, and the historically derived subject matter reinforce the process.  
For the development of effective institutions, World Bank (2002) suggests a 
four-pronged approach: 
  • Design them to complement what exists—in terms of other supporting 
institutions, human capabilities, and available technologies;   
  •  innovate to design institutions that work—and drop those initiatives that do 
not;   
  •  connect communities of market players through open information flows and 
open trade; and    
  •  promote competition among jurisdictions, firms, and individuals.   
In designing the formal institutions, efforts need to be made that they properly 
interact with collective values of the society and, therefore, various dimensions of a 
country’s culture are kept in view. The governments in developing countries like 
Pakistan must accept the challenge for designing and adopting efficient rules, and 
ensuring the effective implementation of the rules.  The government must ensure that  
property rights and contracts are clearly defined and enforced and information is 
shared in a transparent way. It must ensure competition as well. 
Institution need to be so designed that the incentives to all the actors in the 
market, viz., consumer, producers, capitalists, workers, and entrepreneurs, are in 
accordance with the desired objectives. Effective institutions are those that are 
incentive-compatible. They channel information about market conditions, goods, and 
participants. They increase competition in markets.   
Policy-makers are not the only ones who develop the institutions. Business 
people and community members also create institutions.  Corporate, collateral, and 
bankruptcy laws are public institutions, while reciprocity between community A. R. Kemal 
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members and land inheritance norms are private institutions. Many private 
institutions exist under the aegis of public institutions. Enforcement of rules can be 
internal, implemented by the parties affected by the rules; or it is external, 
implemented by a third party. Informal institutions and private formal mechanisms 
generally rely on their own members for enforcement; individual agents organise 
themselves into informal groups, such as business associations or mutual insurance 
systems when the cost of collective action is low and the rules can be easily 
monitored.  Expulsion from the community acts as a deterrent. External enforcement 
mechanisms, such as judicial systems or third-party arbitration, are critical 
mechanisms for the development of integrated markets. They allow access to market 
opportunities for a broader group of market participants. For external enforcement 
mechanisms to be effective, the legitimacy of the enforcer is vital. When the state 
acts as an agent that shares the objectives and beliefs of its citizens—and implements 
rules consistent with these objectives and beliefs—it is more likely to build effective 
formal institutions to support market development. 
 
IV.  INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN 
AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH POVERTY 
As pointed out earlier, institutional decay in Pakistan has led to poor 
governance, which has resulted in ad hoc policy-making. Instability and unpredic-
tability has discouraged long-term investment and encouraged lobbying, corruption, 
and misuse of power, resulting in frustration and dysfunctional behaviour [For 
details, see DRI/McGraw-Hill (1998)]. Poor governance is manifested in corruption, 
inefficiency, ineffectiveness, inaccessibility, intractability, and lack of motivation 
and incentives, and has contributed to the slow growth and increase in poverty [For 
details, see Pakistan (1999)].  
Poverty in Pakistan reflects an interaction of economic, social, legal, and 
political processes, and the failure of the institutions in all of the four areas has led to 
the governance problem. The failure of governance and the domination of political 
power and state apparatus by the èlite has excluded the majority of the population 
from institutionalised decision-making, which is almost completely irrelevant to the 
poor. Management and delivery of public services and public utilities are poor, 
because, virtually, there is no accountability or discipline, and improper incentives 
and controls are in place. Whereas the poor rightly believe that the state has the 
responsibility to provide affordable, effective, and equitable public goods and 
services, the inability of the public sector to deliver has meant that the poor can not 
make much use of these services. For example, UNDP (2003) observes that if the 
poor fall sick, they rarely go to the public health facilities because they fail to deliver 
the services. The poor perceive that public agencies are responsible for their 
vulnerability and erosion of their household, political, civil, and natural resources 
and social assets. It needs to be underscored that the slow pace of institutional Institutional Change, Growth, and Poverty 
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reform, the presence of vested political interests, and political interference in the 
location of projects, excessive centralisation in the management of services, and 
weak implementation capacity have precluded community involvement. This 
perception can be removed only through proper functioning of the institutions. 
Because of the failure of the formal institutions, the poor resort to informal 
institutions and are thus adversely impacted. The informal legal system is 
particularly has deleterious effects on the poor, who possess neither economic nor 
social capital to receive adequate justice. The National Human Development Report 
[UNDP (2003)] notes that whenever there is a dispute, the resolution mechanism is 
such that the commoners fall below poverty levels. Efforts must be made to limit the 
vulnerability of the poor to the vagaries of the system of administrative, political, 
civil, and criminal justice. The failure of state institutions to provide law and order 
and security is a function of the existent police, legal, and judicial structures and 
these are affected by the performance of the four domains of justice including 
administrative, political, judicial and policing.  
The police force is perceived by the poor as a symbol of immense repression 
and exploitation in Pakistan. For them the police is largely responsible for making it 
difficult for the informal sector to function effectively. Various studies indicate that 
the police harasses small traders and vendors, especially women.  
The poor are denied justice, making them quite vulnerable. Their vulnerability 
is exacerbated by the everyday harassment, under-performance, exclusion, or denial 
of basic rights by public officials. The local officials responsible to license and 
regulate economic activities extract rent from the informal sector workers. Because 
of malpractices, including corruption of the local officials, the poor suffer from 
inadequate health cover, education, land management, etc.  
   
V.  THE PROSPECTS OF BETTER GOVERNANCE 
There has been increasing realisation over the last decade that without the 
creation of institutions and respect for them, the growth prospects would be seriously 
compromised [Kemal (2001)].  The Government of Pakistan presented a strategy for 
improvement in governance to the Pakistan Development Forum in 1999, and it was 
well-received by the donor community. However, very little effort was made to 
implement the strategy.  
Various efforts have been made in recent years for the restoration of existing 
institutions and for creating new ones to ensure larger participation of the poor, 
especially the females. The PRSP reiterates the resolve of the Government for a 
series of fundamental transformations, including the devolution of power to the 
grassroots level and decentralisation of administrative and financial authority; 
improved access to justice at the local level; police reforms; civil service reform; 
improvement in financial governance; freedom of information; participation of the 




Perhaps the most significant policy change in the institutional development in 
Pakistan has been the devolution of power from the federal and province level to the 
districts. Under the new system, the district administration and police are answerable 
to the elected chief executive of the district. A system of checks and balances, 
together with citizen monitoring by elected representatives, is necessary to ensure 
security against the abuse of authority. The devolution provides an opportunity for 
local accountability of government—to achieve efficiencies in the way the services 
may be delivered to the poor.  
Devolution assigns service delivery to the local bodies, and these are 
accountable to the community. However, it would be practicable if the district 
administration felt so and if they had to rely on the local revenues to meet the 
expenditures. If devolution is not accompanied with fiscal decentralisation, the 
impact will be limited. Nevertheless, to ensure that the poor communities also 
develop at a rapid rate, a reliable and predictable transfer of funds from the upper 
level of government is necessary.  
Devolution is expected to improve service delivery as local governments can 
better assess spending priorities and can utilise their resources in a cost-effective 
manner. However, the risks need to be recognised. Given that a poorly implemented 
local government reform could harm rather than improve the delivery of services, it 
is important that it succeeds.  
With a view to improving governance, a system of checks and balances 
between  Nazims (Civil Administrators) and the District Co-ordination Officers 
(DCOs) needs to be ensured. As Hassan (2002) points out, the DCO should be the 
sole representative of State at the district level to monitor all the departments. In case 
of serious disagreement with Nazims, they should have the right to report 
independently in writing to the provincial governments. 
 
Access to Justice 
The judicial systems play an important role in the development process as 
they help in resolution of disputes between private parties and between private and 
public parties, by providing a backdrop for the way that individuals and 
organisations behave outside the formal system, and by affecting the evolution of 
society and its norms while being affected by them. These changes bring law and 
order and promote the development of markets, economic growth, and poverty 
reduction. Judicial systems need to balance the need to provide swift and affordable 
justice to the people.   
The basic problems of judicial administration in Pakistan relate to governance 
and administration; case management and delay reduction; automation and court 
information systems; human resources; and infrastructure. These constraints hinder 
the performance of the judiciary. In particular, their performance relating to the 
financial sector leaves much to be desired.  Institutional Change, Growth, and Poverty 
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The success of judicial reforms depends on increasing the accountability of 
judges; that is, providing them with incentives to perform effectively, simplifying 
procedures, and targeting resource increases. One of the most important elements 
affecting judicial accountability is transparency, or the provision of information that 
makes it easy to monitor judicial performance—for example, judicial databases that 
make it easy to track cases and make it hard to manipulate or misplace them. 
Simplifying legal procedures tends to increase judicial efficiency. The 
procedures are particularly important in countries like Pakistan where 
complementary institutions are weak. Judicial independence needs to be coupled 
with a system of social accountability. The channels for such accountability can be 
the free media and civil society organisations; or accountability can be built into the 
judicial system itself. 
With a view to improving the access to justice, the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) outlines the strategy:  
  •  security and equal protection to all the citizens, particularly the poor; 
  •  securing and sustaining of entitlements and reducing the vulnerability of the 
poor; 
  •  strengthen the legitimacy of state institutions; and  
  • creating conditions conducive to pro-poor growth, especially by fostering 
investor confidence.  
To address the vulnerability of the poor, the PRSP suggests various actions 
aimed at alleviating the vulnerability arising from everyday harassment, under-
performance, exclusion, and denial of basic rights by public officials. As pointed out 
earlier, the informal sector is vulnerable because of the rent-seeking behaviour of 
officials responsible for licensing and regulating people’s access to economic and 
environmental assets.    
 
Police Reforms 
The police force needs to be reformed in such a way that instead of being an 
instrument of government coercion, it is a service delivery organisation that protects 
people’s rights. Public Safety Commissions at the national, provincial, and district 
levels, comprising elected representatives, can be helpful in this direction. While 
ensuring functional autonomy of the Police, local control and institutionalised 
accountability at the grassroots can be helpful. An independent Police Complaints 
Authority would also be helpful in expediting investigation of allegations of excesses 
and neglect by the Police.  
The District Public Safety Commission (DPSC), Criminal Justice 
Coordination Committees at the district level, an independent Prosecution Service, 
and strengthening of Police’s capacity for delivery would go a long way towards 
improving the Police force. These measures will hopefully provide the poor and the A. R. Kemal 
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illiterate a more effective recourse to have their grievances redressed, and will also 
provide more open access to justice in their own communities—an important 
element for empowerment, dignity, and rights. 
 
Civil Service Reforms 
Civil services of Pakistan have deteriorated rather sharply over time. Whereas 
the number of public sector employees has increased, the average level of 
competence has fallen. The wages and salaries have been eroded by the sharp growth 
in the size of public sector work force. There are perverse incentives leading to 
corruption. Whereas various Commissions have been set up to downsize the work 
force, the results have been mixed. Though in recent years the salaries of public 
employees have increased, they are still significantly lower in real terms than they 
were in 1990 or 1994. 
Good Governance Report 2010 enumerates 10 factors that animate the crises 
in civil services, including (i) the perception that government is to provide jobs in 
public sector; (ii) poor salary structure; (iii) protecting status quo; (iv) resistance to 
sharing information; (v) centralisation of decision-making; (vi) lack of discipline; 
(vii) lack of professionalism and performance orientation; (viii) corruption; (ix) 
archaic operating procedures and regulatory mechanism; and (x) public aversion to 
public servants.  
The purpose of civil service reforms is to improve the effectiveness and 
performance of the civil service and to ensure its affordability and sustainability over 
time. These reforms are expected to improve upon the service delivery mechanism 
which citizens consider necessary and to enhance the level of institutional capacity in 
the public sector to carry out core government functions. The main elements of the 
Government’s civil service reform strategy include: 
  •  a flatter structure of civil service;  
  •  merit-based recruitment and promotion criteria;  
  •  performance-based compensation;  
  •  incentives to improve innovation (i.e., encourage prudent risk-taking); and  




Because of the misuse of discretionary power at various tiers of the 
government, there has been rampant corruption. The government has established the 
National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to investigate and prosecute cases.  Besides 
punishing the corrupt, preventive measures such as instituting a system that collects 
information and raise the possibilities that corruption is detected would also be 
required.   Institutional Change, Growth, and Poverty 
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The government has outlined an anti-corruption strategy which, among other 
measures, includes legislation for access to information by ordinary citizens; code of 
conduct for eliminating corruption; prohibiting participation in decision-making 
whenever private interests may be present in the performance of public duties; 
declaration of assets by all prominent holders of a public office and their effective 
monitoring; establishing vigilance units; citizen charters; and service delivery 
surveys and report cards.  
 
Freedom of Information 
Free Media can act as a watch-dog, and for this function the access of media 
to all the sources of information is absolutely essential. Whereas access to 
information has improved already, further opening and access to information would 
go a long way towards transparency in the use of public funds and predictability in 
the economic policies. The Freedom of Information Act can go a long way in this 
direction. 
Whereas Pakistan’s statistical system may not be any inferior as compared to 
those in the neighbouring countries, the fact remains that the statistical authorities do 
not have much credibility with the public. While some data are not available, the 
others come after a significant lag. Besides, the data collection procedures, editing 
and processing leave much to be desired. There is a need for reforms in terms of 
legal framework governing statistics, institutional reform, and investment in human 
capital. The statistical authority should be autonomous which could release the data 
without any clearance from any Ministry. There is a need for a long-term plan to 
strengthen the statistical system including training and motivation of the staff and 
strengthening infrastructure.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
There is sufficient empirical evidence across the countries that well-
functioning institutions help in the promotion of growth and reduction of poverty. 
Poor institutions result in higher costs mainly due to inadequate information, 
incomplete definition and enforcement of property rights, and sometimes the barriers 
to the entry of new participants. The better institutions help manage risk from market 
exchange, increase efficiency, and raise the returns to investment. The policy 
formulation and implementation of policy need to be separated because the policy 
implementers may obstruct the evolution of institutions. We may note that there has 
been a decay in the institutions of Pakistan leading to poor governance, which has 
created the problems such as corruption, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, inaccessibility, 
intractability, and lack of motivation and incentives. The poor in particular have been 
hit hard by poor governance. They have to resort to the informal institutions and 
unfortunately even those have been used in Pakistan by the èlite group for their own A. R. Kemal 
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advantages. The service delivery is so poor that they prefer not to avail those 
facilities.  Police force instead of protecting the rights of poor harass them and in 
general the public officials take certain actions which deny them their basic rights. 
With a view to creating better institutions, it is of great significance that 
formal and informal institutions are integrated better. Given the fact that it might be 
very difficult and may not even be desirable to change the indigenous social 
structure, there is an urgent need to know more about the conditions that would help 
in functioning of the institutions. This would be quite helpful in the governance 
structure of a country, ways of participation in political decision-making processes, 
ways of fighting social exclusion, etc. 
While formulating and reforming the institutions, the following should be 
taken into consideration:  
  •  the differentiation between the development of exogenous and endogenous 
institutions; 
  •  existence of different levels of institutions with different time horizons of 
change; and 
  •  importance of the local setting. 
The government has taken various measures over the last few years to set up 
new institutions and to reform the existing ones. The PRSP reiterates the resolve of 
the government for further reform of the institutions. Whereas devolution is the most 
significant policy change in the institutional development in Pakistan, it must be 
ensured that the experiment succeeds. Similarly, the effort for better access of the 
poor to justice should continue. Police force needs to be so reformed that instead of 
being an instrument of government coercion, it emerges as an institution which is 
trusted to be a protector of the poor.  The civil service reforms as enumerated in the 
PRSP would help in improving the governance structure. Similarly, financial 
governance needs to be strengthened and the freedom of information may play an 
important role in this direction. 
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